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Abstract: While the 2007-2010 financial crisis has hit a variety of countries asymmetrically, 
the case of Spain is particularly illustrative: this country experienced a pronounced housing 
bubble partly funded via spectacular developments in its securitization markets leading to looser 
credit standards and subsequent financial stability problems. We analyze the sequential 
deterioration of credit in this country considering rating changes in individual securitized deals 
and on balance sheet   bank conditions. Using a sample of 20,286 observations on securities and 
rating changes from 2000Q1 to 2010Q1 we build a model in which loan growth, on balance-
sheet credit quality and rating changes are estimated simultaneously. Our results suggest that 
loan growth significantly affects on balance-sheet loan performance with a lag of at least two 
years. Additionally, loan performance is found to lead rating changes with a lag of four quarters. 
Importantly, bank characteristics (in particular, observed solvency, cash flow generation and 
cost efficiency) also affect ratings considerably. Additionally, these other bank characteristics 
seem to have a higher weight in the rating changes of securities issued by savings banks as 
compared to those issued by commercial banks. 
JEL Classification: G21 G12. 
Keywords: securitization, lending, risk, financial instability. 5
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In the 2007-2010 financial crisis, the economies of different countries have been affected with various 
degrees of intensity according to their exposure to some of its main drivers. In Spain securitization 
activity grew spectacularly mostly in sync with large increases in bank credit to the private sector. The 
spectacular upward swing in the Spanish credit cycle was buttressed by relatively loose lending practices 
and large increases in housing prices (see Jimenez et al., 2010, and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Hence 
the recent episode of financial instability in Spanish shares many common features with prior instances of 
banking problems (i.e. large increases in loan growth coupled with housing price bubbles). These features 
also emerged together with new factors such as a more extensive use of securitization activity and market 
funding by banks which probably helped to augment the swing in the credit cycle.  
We focus on the recent Spanish credit cycle which largely explains the episodes of financial instability 
and uncertainty that the Spanish banking sector suffered during 2009 and 2010. These episodes gave, in 
turn, rise to the implementation of bank restructuring plans in 2010 and 2011. We characterize the 
sequential evolution of the credit cycle by combining information at the individual security (mortgage-
backed securities, MBS, and asset-backed securities, ABS), institution (i.e. bank), and geographical (i.e. 
region in which each bank operates) levels. The information is quarterly and the sample period ranges 
from the first quarter of 2000 to the first quarter of 2010. We identify the sequential influence of housing 
prices, lending patterns and securitized flows on the credit quality of each individual institution and 
securitization deals over time. The main aim is to illustrate a predictability chain in which changes in 
housing prices and securitization activity may have led to poorer credit quality standards and loan 
defaults, generating financial instability.  
We approximate credit risk developments at the bank level by considering non-performing loans of each 
institution and rating changes at the individual security level. Importantly, our database allows us to 
identify not only the rating of these securities at the time of origination but also over time. We also 
analyze to what extent housing prices, securitization activity and lending may have asymmetric effects 
across institutions and geographically (at the regional level) by identifying the role of each one of these 
factors.  
We find that loan growth significantly affects loan performance with a lag of at least two years.   
Additionally, overall on balance-sheet bank loan performance is also found to explain rating changes of 
securitized assets with a lag of four quarters partly indicating that there is a considerable lag before 
ratings are reassessed. We also find that bank characteristics (in particular, observed solvency, cash flow 
generation and cost efficiency) also affect the ratings of securities deals which are no longer on banks’ 
balance-sheet. Additionally, these bank characteristics seem to have a higher weight in the rating changes 
of securities originated by savings as compared to those originated by commercial banks. 
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1. Introduction 
The economies of different countries have been affected with different degrees of intensity 
according to their exposure to some of the main drivers of the financial crisis.
1 Securitization, 
which has been largely blamed as one of the main contributors to the financial meltdown, is an 
important example in place. While in some countries, securitization played a very large role, in 
other nations the resort to activities in these markets was insignificant from a macroeconomic 
perspective. Similarly, some economies have experienced large increases in housing prices in 
the years prior to the crisis while in other countries housing prices remained stable.  
It is highly likely that by augmenting the amount of funding available to banks, 
securitization activity had a significant and positive impact on credit growth during the years 
prior to the credit crisis (Loutskina and Strahan, 2009, Altunbas et al., 2009). In a number of 
countries experiencing a period credit growth, securitization activity probably strengthened the 
feedback effect between increases in housing prices and the credit expansion. The growth in 
securitization issuance also led to laxer credit standards and looser screening of borrowers 
thereby supporting higher credit growth in the years prior to the crisis (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru 
and Vig, 2010). This is because securitization involves a longer informational distance than 
ordinary loans between the loan’s originator and the ultimate bearer of the loan’s default risk. 
Hence securitization can potentially reduce lenders’ incentives to carefully screen and monitor 
borrowers thereby affecting loan quality. Other factors contributing to laxer credit screening 
standards in the years prior to the crisis include the degree of competition in the banking system, 
external financial imbalances, the level of private sector debt, corporate governance in the 
banking sector, the relative tightness of monetary policy, the intensity of banking supervision.  
Spain has attracted a big deal of the international attention during the current crisis.
2 In 
this country, securitization activity grew spectacularly mostly in sync with large increases in 
                                                            
1 Acharya and Richardson (2009). 
2 See for instance Krugman (2009) or Taylor (2010). 7
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1329
April 2011
bank credit to the private sector. Indeed Spain has been largely labeled as a market in which 
securitization activity grew from being almost insignificant in the late 1990’s to finance a large 
portion of bank lending to the private sector in the years running up to the banking problems.
3 
On the back of an exceptional growth in bank credit, this country also recorded a large rise in 
private sector debt. As in many episodes of banking problems across the world, the spectacular 
upward swing in the Spanish credit cycle was buttressed by looser lending practices and large 
increases in housing prices (see Tornell and Westermann, 2002, and Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009). Hence the recent Spanish episode of financial instability shares many common features 
with many early episodes of banking problems (i.e. large increases in loan growth coupled with 
housing bubbles). These features also emerged together with new factors such as financial 
innovation in securitization markets.
4  
  In this paper we focus on the recent Spanish credit cycle which largely explains the 
banking problems in this country and, in particular, the episodes of financial instability and 
uncertainty that the Spanish banking sector suffered during 2009 and 2010. These episodes 
gave, in turn, rise to the implementation of banking restructuring plans in 2010 and early 2011. 
We characterize the sequential evolution of the credit cycle and claim that securitization and, in 
particular, mortgage-backed securitization (MBS onwards), together with housing prices, may 
have had a large and lasting effect – through excessive lending – in triggering the banking 
problems in Spain. We conduct our empirical analysis of the credit cycle by combining 
information at the individual security (mortgage-backed securities, MBS, and asset-backed 
securities,  ABS), institution (i.e. bank), and geographical (i.e. region in which each bank 
operates) levels. The information is quarterly and the sample period runs from 2000Q1 to 
2010Q1. We identify the sequential influence of housing prices, lending patterns and securitized 
                                                            
3 Securitization issuance totaled 5 billion in 1999 and 90 billion in 2006. 
4 Although it goes beyond the specific goal of this paper, Spain also pioneered some of the macro-prudential 
supervision initiatives undertaken in the years that preceded the financial crisis. In particular, the role of counter-
cyclical provisions implemented in 2000 as a way of reducing pro-cyclicality in the banking system. This 
provisioning has been largely identified as an attenuating factor that may have reduced the impact of the financial 
crisis on Spain. These provisions have even inspired some of the proposals for reform of the financial system 
architecture to be incorporated in the new Basle III regulatory initiatives.  
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flows on the credit quality of each individual institution and securitization deal over time. The 
main aim is to illustrate a predictability chain in which changes in housing prices and 
securitization activity may have led to poorer credit quality standards and loan defaults, 
generating financial instability.  
We approximate credit risk developments at the bank level by considering non-
performing loans of each institution and rating changes at the individual security level. 
Importantly, our database allows us to identify not only the rating of these securities at the time 
of origination but also their evolution over time. We also analyze to what extent housing prices, 
securitization activity and lending may have asymmetric effects across institutions and 
geographically (at the regional level) by identifying the role of each of these factors. Our results 
suggest that credit developments in Spain were not that different from those experienced by 
other countries in previous episodes of banking problems identified by earlier literature (see 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). We find that loan growth significantly affects loan performance 
with a lag of at least two years.  Additionally, overall bank loan performance is also found to 
explain ex-post rating changes with a distance of four quarters. It is also remarkable that 
originating bank characteristics (in particular, observed solvency, cash flow generation and cost 
efficiency) also affect considerably the ratings of securities deals which are no longer on the 
balance-sheet. Additionally, these bank characteristics seem to have a higher weight in the 
rating changes of securities originated by savings banks as compared to those originated by 
commercial banks. 
The paper is structured in five sections following this introduction. Section 2 surveys 
the main literature and the empirical evidence on the role of securitization in the crisis. The case 
of Spain is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the main hypotheses, data and empirical 
methodology. The results are discussed in Section 5. The paper ends up in section 6 with a 
summary of the main conclusions and policy implications.  9
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2. Lending, securitization and financial stability: the Spanish case  
2.1. Securitization and financial stability 
The crisis has shown that securitization is heavily dependent on markets’ perceptions and could 
be subject to sudden bouts of illiquidity generated from investors’ concerns. Namely the 
consequences of the increased participation in bank funding by financial markets’ investors and 
the large increases in securitized assets, can led to acute liquidity crises. According to Kane 
(2010), the pre-crisis bubble in securitization can be traced back to the wrong incentives while 
Fahri and Tirole (2009) link securitization as a major contributing factor to incentives towards 
leverage and the building up of systemic risks.  
Overall, the rapid development in the market for credit risk transfer played a major role 
altering banks’ functions.  Structurally, securitization allowed banks to turn traditionally illiquid 
claims (overwhelmingly in the form of bank loans) into marketable securities. The development 
of securitization has therefore allowed banks to off-load part of their credit exposure to other 
investors thereby lowering regulatory pressures on capital requirements allowing them to raise 
new funds.  The massive development of the private securitization market experienced in recent 
years coincided with a period of low risk aversion and scant defaults. This resulted in a number 
of shortcomings in firms’ risk management tools and models, which often used default figures 
from this period and tended to underestimate default and liquidity risks. The most prominent 
example is the securitization of mortgage loans which diversify idiosyncratic risks but renders 
the underlying portfolio subject to macroeconomic risks including declines in housing prices.  
A number of studies have analyzed the impact of securitization on financial stability 
from a wider perspective. The broad idea is that the availability of credit risk transfer 
mechanisms has changed banks’ role dramatically from their traditional relationship based 
lending to originators and distributors of loans. This change has implications on bank’s 
incentives to take on new risks (Shin, 2009).  
However, the overall view prior to the crisis was that in addition to allowing lenders to 
conserve costly capital, securitization improved financial stability by smoothing out the risks 10
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among many investors (Duffie, 2008). Indeed, a widely held view prior to the recent global 
credit crisis, underlined the positive effect of securitization in diversifying credit risk across the 
financial system, strengthening its overall resilience (Greenspan, 2005). From the perspective of 
individual banks securitization was expected to be used to modify their risk profile by allowing 
them to manage more effectively their credit risk portfolio geographically or by sector. Scant 
early empirical evidence from the pre-crisis period also goes in this direction. Jiangli and 
Pritsker (2008) argue that securitization increased bank profitability and leverage while 
reducing overall insolvency risk. Other studies also found a positive effect of securitization on 
bank performance. In particular, banks more active in the securitization market were found to 
have lower solvency risk and higher profitability levels (Duffee and Zhou, 2001; Cebenoyan 
and Strahan, 2004; Jiangli et al., 2007).   
At the same time there were progressively more skeptical views on the impact of 
securitization on the financial system stability. Some argue that by making illiquid loans liquid 
securitization could increase, other things being equal, the risk appetite of banks (Calem and 
LaCour, 2003; Wagner, 2007; and Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2009). Risk sharing within the 
financial sector through securitization can also amplify bank risks also at the systemic risk level 
(Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2010). Wagner (2007) shows that the liquidity of bank assets 
attained to securitization increases banking instability and the externalities associated with 
banking failures, as banks have stronger incentives to take on new risk.  
2.2. Lending and housing prices and securitization 
An important feature in many countries is the role of securitization in the lending and housing 
prices boom and burst. At the macroeconomic level, the dynamics of the relationship between 
lending, housing prices and securitization have been largely unexplored although a rising 
interest has recently emerged with the financial crisis. There is an empirical literature studying 
the interaction of lending and housing prices both at the international (Hofmann, 2001; 
Tsatsaronis and Zhu, 2004) and the individual country levels (Gerlach and Peng, 2005; Gimeno 
and Martínez-Carrascal, 2005). In addition the cyclical component of mortgage credit and its 11
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interaction with property prices has also been underscored (Borio and Lowe, 2002, for a broad 
sample of industrialized countries; Goodhart, 1995, for the United Kingdom; and Oikarinen, 
2009, for Finland). Rajan (2005) suggests that developments in the financial sector such as 
securitization may have enhanced more ‘financial-sector-induced’ procyclicality than in the past 
creating higher probability for banking problems.  
Interestingly, most of the evidence tends to suggest a strong impact from housing prices 
to credit than from credit to housing prices. In this respect recent evidence has also shown that 
subprime credit activity did not seem to have had much impact per se on subsequent housing 
price returns, as shown by Coleman et al. (2009) for the United States. On the other hand, 
securitization seems to have strengthened the impact of housing prices on mortgage credit (as 
shown by Carbó and Rodriguez, 2010 for Spain). This latter factor seems to be particularly 
important in light of the recent crisis. In this respect there is mounting evidence suggesting that 
securitization activity has led to laxer screening of borrowers in the years prior to the crisis. The 
reasoning tends to be that by creating – informational – distance between the loan’s originator 
and the ultimate bearer of the loan’s default risk, securitization reduces lenders’ incentives to 
carefully screen and monitor borrowers.  In other words, the idea is that as securities are passed 
through from originating banks’ balance sheets to the markets there are incentives for financial 
intermediaries to devote less effort to screen borrowers. In the short-term this would contribute 
to looser credit standards, less credit-worthy borrowers than in the past were denied credit 
would be able to obtain it. In the long-term, this would lead to higher default rates. 
The laxer screening of borrowers is typically linked to an expansion in the credit 
granted. Indeed, Mian and Sufi (2008) – using comprehensive information broken down by 
United States postal zip codes – show that securitization played an important role in the 
expansion of the supply of credit. In this direction Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) suggest that lending 
standards declined more in those  United States areas experiencing larger credit booms, housing 
price increases and higher mortgage securitization rates. Results from Keys et al. (2010) suggest 
that existing securitization practices did adversely affect the screening incentives. Analyzing the 12
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subprime lending they show that conditional on being securitized, the portfolio with greater ease 
of securitization defaults by around 10%-25% more than a similar risk profile group with a 
lesser ease of securitization. These results suggest that screening and monitoring incentives may 
diminish with securitization.  
There is also evidence that securitization has quantitatively increased the amount of 
credit granted making it less dependent on specific banking or monetary policy conditions 
(Loutskina, 2010). Loutskina and Strahan (2009) show that the increasing depth of the mortgage 
secondary market fostered by securitization has reduced the effect of lender financial conditions 
on credit supply. In line with this hypothesis, Altunbas et al. (2010) find that, prior to the 
current financial crisis, banks making more use of securitization were more sheltered from the 
effects of monetary policy changes. However, their macro-relevance exercise highlights that the 
shock-absorber role of securitization on bank lending could even reverse in a situation of 
financial distress.  
2.3. Securitization, risk-taking and rating changes 
A recent strand of the literature concentrates on the role that securitization has on risk-taking 
and the determinants of the credit quality of the securities themselves. This is the area where our 
paper aims to contribute by analyzing the determinants of rating changes also considering the 
relationships between securitization, lending and financial instability addressed in the previous 
sections. 
Part of the most recent empirical literature questioned whether securitization activity 
makes further acquisition of risks more attractive for banks. Krahnen and Wilde (2006) report 
an increase in the systemic risk of banks, after securitization. Michalak and Uhde (2009) 
provide empirical evidence that securitization has a negative impact on banks' financial 
soundness. Insterjord (2005) highlights that when the bank has access to a richer set of tools to 
manage risk it behaves more aggressively in acquiring new risks. Similarly, Hansel and 
Krahnen (2007) find that the activity of the European CDO market has enhanced the risk 
appetite of the banks that are active in this market. 13
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Enhancement of risk appetite is also related to the regulatory capital arbitrage.   
Securitization has often been used by banks to lower their regulatory needs for costly equity 
capital charges. However banks may have an incentive to securitize less risky loans thereby 
lowering their capital positions (Calem and LaCour-Litle, 2003). This behavior derives from the 
existence of high capital standards to exploit the benefits of securitizing assets to undertake 
regulatory capital arbitrage. Through securitization banks can potentially increase capital 
adequacy ratios without decreasing their loan portfolios’ risk exposure. In other words, banks 
may securitize less risky loans and keep the riskier ones. Ambrose et al. (2005) empirically 
showed that securitized loans have experienced lower ex-post defaults than those retained in 
balance sheet.   
Bank capitalization plays a role in this respect. De Marzo (2010) suggests that pooling 
has an information destruction effect that is costly for the intermediary. This effect is reduced if 
the intermediary’s private information is positively correlated across the assets. Hence if the 
incentives of investors and banks are misaligned, banks – as originators – should also have 
adequate capital so that warranties and representations can be taken seriously to avoid a bad use 
of securitization (Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008).  
A more scant but very recent literature considers the dynamics of rating changes in 
securitized deals. Rating agencies perform a unique role in this respect. Analyzing downgrades, 
Higgins et al. (2010) find that ABS downgrades have an impact on the originating bank parent’s 
performance. Ashcraft et al. (2010) find evidence that ratings levels were less conservative 
around the MBS market peak of 2005-2007. The involvement of rating agencies should go 
beyond providing passive credit-quality certification and theoretically includes a more active 
approach over the economic cycle. This is crucial for our analysis as large part of our empirical 
analysis revolves around the issue of how rating changes of the underlying deals are determined.  
 14
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3. The Spanish case: a changing role for securitization 
Little has been said or explored on a possible role for securitization supporting credit growth in 
countries that experienced a lending and housing bubble in the years before the crisis, such as 
Spain. Housing prices in the years prior to the crisis grew steeply in some European countries 
including the UK, Ireland and Spain. Indeed in Spain housing prices increased by more than 
180% between 1997 and 2007. Mortgage financing has also been the focus of the debate in 
these countries. Almazán et al. (2008) analyze securitization trends in Spain during 1999-2006, 
before the financial crisis. They suggest that the main driver of loan securitization in those years 
was liquidity needs. 
ABS securitization typically involves selling a large portfolio of loans (including 
mortgages, consumer loans or loans to small and medium sized companies) to a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV or “fondo de titulización”). The SPV or “fondo de titulización” issues in turn 
asset-backed securities (also called “bonos de titulización”) to fund the transaction. Those bonds 
are bought in turn by investors, either directly or via conduits such as SIVs (Special Investment 
Vehicles). As noted by Martín-Oliver and Saurina (2007) in Spain the originating bank also acts 
as the servicer of the loan portfolio (i.e. receiving monthly payment, dealing with arrears and so 
on) while borrowers are not typically aware of whether their loans have been securitized or not. 
Through this procedure, banks can transfer credit risk out of their balance sheets to outside 
investors.  
As for the specific regulation of these instruments in Spain, it was not until 1992 (Law 
19/1992 of securitization vehicles) that the creation of SPVs to securitize mortgage loans was 
authorized. The legal authorization for the setting up of SPVs to securitize assets other than 
mortgages was granted in 1998 (Royal Decree 926/1998).  
As shown by Almazan et al. (2008), even if the main regulation on MBS in Spain was 
implemented in 1998, the rise in securitization was noticeable from 2001 onwards and, in 
particular, from 2005 onwards. Housing prices also increased considerably during that period. 
Carbó and Rodriguez (2010) analyze the relationship between housing prices and mortgage 15
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credit in Spain. Using cointegration analysis and Vector-Error-Correction (VEC) models on a 
sample covering the 1988Q4 to 2008Q4 period, they find that both housing prices and mortgage 
credit interact in the short- and in the long-run. Their results also suggest that there were a 
regime shift in mortgage lending in Spain starting in 2001, when mortgage credit securitization 
grew substantially, although the role of securitization is not analyzed explicitly.
5 
  The evolution of securitization in recent years offers some relevant information on the 
magnitude of MBS and ABS securitization in Spain. Using data from the European 
Securitization Forum, Figure 1 depicts the issuance and outstanding values of MBS and ABS 
(including CDOs) in Euro area countries comparing 2006Q1 and 2010Q1. Netherlands is the 
country with the largest outstanding values of MBS and ABS issued in 2010Q1 (Eur 300.8 bln), 
followed by Spain (289.4 bln), Italy (Eur 211.7 bln) and Germany (Eur 93.7 bln). Figure 2 
shows the evolution in the issuance and outstanding values for Spain, well as the total number 
of upgrades and downgrades of these securities from 2008Q1 to 2010Q1.  The issuance of ABS 
grew constantly from Eur 3 bln in 2008.Q1 to Eur 16 bln in 2009.Q1, and then declined 
progressively afterwards to Eur 1 bln in 2010Q1. As for MBS, the issuance was particularly high 
in 2008Q2 (Eur 20 bln) and 2008Q4 (Eur 10 bln) also declining during 2009 down to Eur 1 bln 
in 2010Q1. The outstanding values of these securities give an idea of the significant potential 
risk transferring associated to them. In particular, the outstanding values of Spanish ABS grew 
from Eur 42 bln in 2008.1 to Eur 81 bln in 2009.4, declining to 75 bln in 2010Q1. As for the 
MBS, the outstanding values changed from Eur 112 bln in 2008.1 to Eur 172 in 2009.2, falling 
afterwards down to Eur 164 bln in 2010.Q1.  
Importantly, there were a significant number of rating changes during this period. In 
particular, there were 43 upgrades and 871 downgrades, which give an idea of the deterioration 
of these instruments during the crisis. This deterioration is linked to the evolution of loan 
                                                            
5 As for the specific relationship between financing and housing prices, Gimeno and Martínez Carrascal (2010) carry 
out an application to the Spanish case. This represents the first explicit approach to the interaction between financing 
and housing prices in Spain. Their results show that growing imbalances in the mortgage credit market tend to bring 
down housing prices in the long run, whereas in the short-term increases in mortgage credit bring about a rise in 
housing prices. Similarly, Martínez-Pagés and Maza (2003) use an error correction model, where real income and 
nominal interest rates are posited as the main variables explaining the evolution of Spanish housing prices. 16
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performance. While before 2007Q4 loan default rates where around 1%, this rate increased from 
1.3% in 2008Q1 to 5.65% in 2010Q1. Importantly, the rise in default rates was preceded by a 
very significant loan growth in previous years and, in particular, during 2006 where annual loan 
growth was above 25% on average (Figure 3).  
 
4. Data and methodology 
4.1. The database 
Our sample consists of MBS and ABS issued by Spanish banks. We have information on 985 
securities of which 565 are MBS (504 Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities and 61 
Commercial Property Mortgages) and 420 are ABS (220 on Corporate Loans, 126 on CDOs and 
74 on Consumer Loans). The data frequency is quarterly covering the 2000Q1 to 2010Q1 
period. The information on MBS and ABS securitization at issuance is obtained from Dealogic 
while the information on rating changes is obtained from Moody’s and ABS-NET. Bank-level 
information is obtained from balance-sheet and income statements provided by the Spanish 
Banking Association (AEB) and the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks (CECA). The 
database covers 720 rating changes (86 upgrades and 634 downgrades), without including the 
rating at origination. The panel is unbalanced and the total number of observations is 20,286. 
  4.2. Empirical strategy 
    4.2.1 Identification and empirical model 
We aim to identify the main determinants of the changes in the quality of MBS and ABS over 
time as the main drivers of risk transferring at Spanish banks. One important identifying 
assumption in our model is that we are focusing on securities/instruments (MBS and ABS) which 
allow issuers to transfer risk, as opposed to other instruments (such as covered bonds) which 
retain a big deal of the risk within the bank balance sheet. This will also permit us to analyze the 
speed of adjustment of rating changes to changes in market fundamentals, bank credit quality 
and other bank conditions. In order to achieve these objectives convincingly, we need to 
identify to what extent the volume of securities issued by banks in previous periods – along with 17
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market fundamentals liquidity and other loan supply conditions – may affect current loan 
growth of the bank that issue the instrument. Additionally, we hypothesize that lagged loan 
growth – along with other bank-level variables – may also affect the quality and ex-post 
performance of the underlying loan portfolio attached to each security issued by the bank on top 
of market fundamentals.  
To understand our estimation, consider three reduced-form equations of loan-growth of 
the bank that issue the instrument, the performance of the loan portfolio of that bank and the 
rating of the instrument issued by that bank: 
Loan growthi,j,t = f (loan growthi,jt-1, bank conditionsi,j,t, market fundamentals)              (1) 
NPL ratioi,j,t = = f (NPL ratioi,j,t-1, loan growthi,j,t-l, bank conditionsi,j,t,  
market fundamentals)                                    (2) 
 
Ratingi,j,t = f (NPL ratioi,j,t-l, bank conditionsi,j,t, market fundamentals)                                  (3) 
 
All variables are expressed at the instrument-level. In equation 1, the loan growth in 
period t of the bank j that issues the instrument i is explained by the one-quarter lagged loan 
growth of that bank (since we expect current loan supply to be affected by lagged loan supply), 
a vector of other bank characteristics and a vector market fundamentals. The vector of bank 
conditions includes the solvency ratio at the beginning of the quarter (Equity/Total assetsijt-1), 
size (log of total assets), observed deposit funding at the beginning of the quarter (Deposits/total 
liabilitiesijt-1), the volume of securitization of the same bank in the last four quarters 
(Securitizationij(t-1,t-4)), an indicator of market power (Lerner indexijt),
6 the efficiency ratio 
(Cost/income ratioijt) a measure of customer service expansion in the last two years (Branch 
growthijt-8) and an indicator of observed cash-flow generation at the beginning of the quarter 
(RoEijt-1). In principle, loans are expected to grow with observed solvency, deposit funding, 
securitization and cash-flow. We also hypothesize that higher competition (lower Lerner index) 
                                                            
6 The Lerner index is computed at the bank-level as the difference between the price of total assets interest and non-
interest income/total assets) and their estimated marginal costs, divided by the price of total assets. Marginal costs are 
estimated using a translog cost function of total bank costs including one output (total assets) and three inputs 
(deposits, labor and physical capital). 18
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may foster risk-taking by banks and accelerate loan growth. Additionally, an increase in the 
efficiency ratio (higher costs) may reduce loan supply. As for the market and macro 
fundamentals in equation (1), we include the 1-year euribor rate (1-year Euribor ratet) as a 
proxy for market funding costs, GDP growth (GDPGijt) and lagged housing prices (Real 
housing prices growthijt-1). 
As for equation (2), the ratio of non-performing loans over total assets in period t of the 
bank j that issues the security i (Non-performing loans ratioijt) is explained by lagged non-
performing loans (Non-performing loans ratioijt-1) – since we also expect loan performance to be 
explained by past performance – a vector of bank conditions and market fundamentals. In 
equation (2) the vector of bank conditions includes one year, two years and four years-lagged 
loan growth in order to estimate how loan performance is affected by previous loan growth. It 
also includes market power (Lerner indexijt), the efficiency ratio (Cost/income ratioijt), a 
measure of customer service expansion in the last two years (Branch growthijt-8) and the 
indicator of observed cash-flow generation at the beginning of the quarter (RoEijt-1). The lagged 
ratio of loan-loss provisions (Ratio of provisions on loan lossesijt-1) is also included as an ex-ante 
indicator of bank loan performance. As for market and macroeconomic controls in equation (2), 
we include GDP growth (GDPGijt). 
Our main equation showing securitization quality, as expressed by the rating of the 
security i at time t (Ratingijt) is explained by one year, two years and four years-lagged loan 
performance (non-performing loan or NPL ratio) in order to capture the speed of adjustment of 
the instrument’s rating to the quality of the loan portfolio of the bank that issue that security. 
The vector of bank conditions includes observed bank solvency (Equity/Total assetsijt-1), size 
(log of total assets), efficiency (Cost/income ratioijt) and cash-flow generation (RoEijt-1). Market 
fundamentals include the maturity of the instrument (Years to maturityijt) as well as the 1-year 
euribor rate (1-year Euribor ratet), GDP growth (GDPGijt) and lagged real housing prices (Real 
housing prices growthijt-1). In equation (3) it would be interesting to see if expected credit 
ratings respond negatively to a deterioration of loan performance or bank solvency, efficiency or 19
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RoE. Similarly, the rating is expected to be negatively related to interest rates and positively to 
GDP or observed housing prices growth. The definition of the variables and the main sources 
are shown in Table 1. It should be noted that GDP growth and real housing prices growth have 
been computed regionally, taking the branch distribution of the issuing bank across the different 
regions as a weighting factor for those banks operating in multiple regions. 
As for the cross-section and over time variation of our main dependent variable showing 
changes in the rating of the instruments (Ratingijt), Figure 4 depicts the number of securities and 
their rating during 2000Q1-2010Q1. The number of securities issued significantly increases 
over time and, in particular, during the years of the crisis. MBS and ABS issuance were more 
intense from 2007 onwards. It can be also observed that the ratings for issues originated prior to 
the crisis tend to substantially worsen during the crisis.   
  4.2.2 GMM simultaneous estimation methodology 
Two main caveats determine the selection of our estimation method.  First, endogeneity is a 
potential concern in estimating equations (1) to (3) since they relate to a similar set of 
potentially endogenous regressors such as bank profitability or efficiency to our main dependent 
variables. Secondly, cross-equation relationships are present. In particular, equations (1) and (2) 
are needed to identify (3) and impose some cross-equation restrictions since lagged loan growth 
affects loan performance in equation (2) and, at the same time lagged (observed) loan 
performance might determine the current rating of the instrument in equation (3). To obtain 
efficient estimates and address the issue of endogeneity and cross-equation restrictions we 
propose to estimate (1), (2) and (3) jointly using a General-Method of Moments (GMM) 
approach with fixed effects and time dummies. All variables (excepting size) are expressed as 
ratios or growth rates so that we can interpret the coefficient as marginal effects on those rates 
and ratios. 
Lagged values of these explanatory variables (i.e., variables lagged an additional 
period) are used as instruments.  This treatment eliminates perhaps the most obvious source of 20
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endogeneity, but, as is well understood, it does not eliminate all such sources of endogeneity if 
errors are correlated over time.  The primary concern here is that some unobservable aspect of 
the environment in which securities are rated is associated with bank loan growth as well as the 
variables measuring loan performance. Our primary defense is to include market-specific 
measures that control for those otherwise unobservable aspects of the change in markets over 
time, as it is the use of market fundamentals in our specification. Additionally, we have 
included measures of market population, population density, and regional unemployment rates 
(not reported) as instruments for loan growth and loan performance. 
The GMM estimation relies on a set of orthogonality conditions which are the products 
of equations and instruments. Initial conditions for estimation are obtained using three-stage 
least squares (3SLS), which is a restricted version of the simultaneous equation GMM model. 
Unlike the standard 3SLS, the GMM estimator allows for heteroskedasticity in addition to cross-
equation correlation when some variables appear both as exogenous and (lagged) endogenous 
variables in the different equations (Hansen, 1982; Wooldrige, 2002).  
5. Results  
 5.1.  Baseline  model 
The results of the baseline model are shown in Table 2. The equation of the loan growth of the 
bank issuing the security is shown in the second column. As expected, the lagged loan growth 
of the bank is positively and significantly related to current loan growth. As for other bank 
conditions, the observed solvency at the beginning of the quarter (Equity/Total assetsijt-1), the 
observed the deposit ratio (Deposits/total liabilitiesijt-1), the lagged values of securitization 
(Securitizationij(t-1,t-4)) and branch growth (Branch growthijt-8), and the observed return on equity 
(RoEijt-1) are positively and significantly related to current loan growth. Some of these variables 
have a particularly high economic impact. In particular, a 10% increase in the lagged solvency 
ratio explains a .89% increase in loan growth, a 10% growth in the deposit ratio increases loan 
growth by .78%, and a 10% increase in securitization over the last year increases current 21
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quarterly loan growth by .96%. The Lerner index is negatively and significantly related to loan 
growth, which suggests that higher competition stimulates lending.  
As for market fundamentals, market rates (1-year Euribor ratet) are negatively and 
significantly related to loan growth, as expected. In particular, a 10% increase in this rate 
reduces loan growth by 3.9%. GDP growth and one quarter-lagged real housing prices growth 
are positively and significantly related to loan growth so that a 10% increase in these variables 
is shown to have a 10.4% and a 7.1% increase, respectively, on loan growth. Table 2 also 
includes a dummy to check whether the behavior of the main dependent variable differs 
between MBS and ABS. In the case of loan growth, MBS issuance seems to be more intensively 
related to loan growth than ABS issuance, since a big deal of lending growth during the sample 
period has been related to mortgage financing.  
The results of the equation where loan performance (non-performing loans or NPL 
ratioijt), is the dependent variable are shown in the third column of Table 2. As for loan growth 
values, only the two years and four years-lagged values of this variable seem to affect current 
loan performance. We also tested if two quarters and three quarters-lagged loan growth affect 
loan performance significantly but the coefficients of these variables were not significant either. 
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient of lagged loan growth increases with the order of the 
lag, revealing that current loan performance is mostly explained by high-order lagged loan 
growth, which is indicative of some lack of institutional memory behavior in lending standards, 
suggesting that looser credit quality standards in periods of credit expansion lead to poorer ex-
post loan performance as the time from the last peak of the lending cycle increases. Higher 
inefficiency (Cost/income ratioijt) and lagged branch growth (Branch growthijt-8) are found to be 
negatively and significantly related to the non-performing loans ratio which advocates for a 
negative effect of operating costs on loan risk. The lagged ratio of provisions on loan losses to 
total assets – as an ex-ante indicator of loan performance – is positively and significantly related 
to the NPL ratio while the impact of GDP on this ratio is negative and significant, as expected.  22
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  The fourth column in Table 2 shows the results for our main equation of securitization 
quality as indicated by the ratings of MBS and ABS jointly considered. Lagged values of the 
NPL ratio are negatively and significantly related to the rating of the instrument, although they 
are only significant for one, two and four years-lagged values. The one quarter, two quarters and 
three quarters-lagged values of the NPL ratio (not shown in the table for simplicity) where not 
found to be statistically significant either. These results indicate that ratings are related to the 
quality of the on-balance sheet loan portfolios but only after four or more quarters. Therefore, 
investors are informed on the quality of the securities with a delay of at least one year in relation 
to on-balance sheet loans. The intensity of the adjustment increases with the order of the lag, 
which suggests that persistent loan deterioration tend to affect ratings more significantly. As for 
instrument-level and market fundamentals, the maturity of the instrument (Years to maturityijt), 
and observed GDP growth and real housing prices growth are positively and significantly 
related to the rating of the instrument while market interest rates have a negative impact. 
  As expected, market fundamentals have an impact on MBS and ABS ratings. More 
interestingly, also the characteristics of the originating bank have an effect on the ex-post rating 
changes of the loans they originated. These characteristics include bank capital, size, 
profitability (RoE) and cost inefficiency, with solvency and profitability having a particularly 
high positive economic impact (estimated coefficients are .104 and .078, respectively). This is 
issue is particularly interesting as once issued, the expected payoffs of MBS and ABS securities 
are expected to depend entirely on the underlying loans and not on the health of the bank that 
originated them. Although we are agnostic about the interpretation of the significance of these 
results on rating changes, we hypothesize that rating agencies may possibly rely on bank 
characteristics (other than loan performance) since they may face some opaqueness in 
determining the quality of the security over time. Presumably, higher ratings are partly based on 
the assumption that better banks make better loans, and therefore produced better collateral 
underlying their securities. Hence ex-post (i.e. after securitization) changes in the financial 23
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situation of the issuing bank might probably have an impact on the securitized loans ratings 
which was not already been accounted for by the markets. 
  The inclusion of a dummy distinguishing between MBS and ABS shows that ratings 
levels are significantly higher for MBS than for ABS in the sample period. The latter indicates 
that it is worthwhile breaking down the estimations by instrument to check if our results and 
financial stability implications differ between MBS and ABS. 
  5.2. Breakdown by MBS and ABS 
Tables 3 and 4 offer the results for MBS and ABS respectively. While the estimations are similar 
to the baseline model, some differences between the MBS and ABS cases deserve specific 
attention. To examine these differences from a statistical standpoint, we conduct tests of the 
differences between the coefficients. Besides, we also include a dummy that distinguishes 
collateral type by instrument. In particular, in the case of MBS, the dummy takes the value 1 if 
the instrument is backed by a residential mortgage and zero if it is backed by a commercial real 
estate loan. As for ABS, the dummy takes the value 1 if the security is backed by a corporate 
loan and zero for other types of collateral and CDOs.  
  While the loan growth equation and the non-performing loan equations offer similar 
results, the rating equation provides some interesting differences between MBS and ABS. In 
particular, the speed at which the deterioration in on-balance sheet loan portfolio is reflected on 
the rating of the instrument is lower for ABS since only the two years and four years-lagged 
values of the NPL ratio are statistically significant, while in the case of MBS the one year-lagged 
value of the NPL ratio is significant, as it happened in the baseline model.
7 It should be also 
noted that the economic impact of NPL ratios on the rating is higher in the case of ABS (the 
differences with the estimated coefficients of MBS are significant at the 1% level). Other 
significant differences are found such as the higher impact of solvency ratios and the maturity of 
the instrument in the rating of ABS and the higher impact of size, efficiency, RoE, the market 
                                                            
7 These differences between MBS and ABS are also supportive of the hypothesis that opaqueness may be related to the 
complexity of the instrument, thereby making more difficult to assess the quality of ABS compared to MBS, as 
suggested, inter alia, by Fender and Mitchell (2005). 24
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interest rate and, in particular, of real housing prices on the rating of MBS compared to the 
rating of ABS. 
  Regarding the type of collateral, the dummies included in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that 
the rating of residential mortgage loans is significantly higher than the rating of commercial real 
estate loans. Similarly, the rating of ABS backed with corporate loans seems to be significantly 
higher than the rating of ABS backed by consumer loans and receivables. 
  5.3. Risk-transferring vs. retained issuance 
An important feature of our data is that during the 2008-2010 period, Spanish banks issued 
much more MBS and ABS deals than any time before – as shown above in Figures 1 and 2 –.  
These issues however, were not passed-through from banks’ balance sheets to outside investors 
but were retained on the originating banks’ books instead. The overwhelming motivation for the 
creating of these retained ABS and MBS securities was to pledge them as collateral with the 
central bank in order to obtain liquidity. Hence relative to the pre-crisis, when there was strong 
demand from investors’ for MBS and ABS, in the 2008-2010 period there was a completely 
different motivation for banks for their involvement in securitization markets. Indeed during the 
latter phase, securitization did not offer banks the possibility of obtaining long-term funding and 
the transferring of underlying credit risks. This different motivation, in turn, implies a different 
relationship between banks and the MBS and ABS deals they originated. In other words, there 
might be a relationship between the recourse to securitization (i.e. to cover liquidity needs) and 
bank weakness that is unique to this period. We would expect, as a result a closer relationship 
between bank characteristics and rating changes during the crisis.
8 
  In table 5, we explore whether there are differences in the results obtained for both time 
periods. Overall, all the statistical relationships found in Table 3 hold for both periods but there 
are some differences also in the magnitude of the coefficients that are worthwhile noting. In 
particular, the Lerner index seems to be a significant determinant of loan growth only during the 
                                                            
8 We are most grateful to an anonymous referee and the editor of the Journal of International Money and Finance for 
pointing this.  25
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first period. A likely explanation for this result is that the impact of competition on bank risk-
taking happened mostly before the crisis when most risks (i.e. real estate and construction 
exposure) were actually being accumulated. We also find, as expected, that the magnitude of the 
coefficients of the impact of bank-level characteristics on securitized deals’ rating is 
significantly larger for the crisis period (2008-2010).   
  5.4. Governance, ownership and specialization issues 
An important factor affecting rating changes and risk transferring in securitization is the extent 
to which certain type of intermediaries may have had more incentives to create and transfer 
lower quality risks than others. These differences may be then related to ownership, governance 
and specialization issues. The issuers in our sample are both commercial (9,128 observations) 
and savings banks (11,158 observations). As for some potentially significant institutional 
differences, savings banks in Spain are stakeholder-based firms and do not quote in stock 
markets as most commercial banks do. Additionally, savings banks have been more specialized 
in lending than commercial banks and, hence, they may have had more incentives to securitize 
loans given that their loan growth has been higher than for commercial banks in the years before 
the crisis. Even if both commercial and savings banks are subjected to the same supervision and 
regulation in Spain, the abovementioned differences in ownership and specialization may have 
resulted in different issuance practices. We wonder the extent to which rating changes reflect 
these potential differences between commercial and savings banks.  
Table 6 replicates the baseline model for commercial and savings banks separately. 
Although the signs and main relationships are similar, some specific explanatory variables in 
the model exhibit statistically significant differences between both types of institutions. This is 
the case of market power in the loan growth equation, which is only significant in the savings 
banks equation, suggesting that the role of competition in stimulating loan growth has been 
more intense at savings banks. There are also some significant differences in the determinants of 
the rating equation. The economic impact (size of the coefficients) of the lagged NPL ratios on 
the instrument rating is higher for securities issued by savings banks (with the differences being 26
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significant at 5% level) suggesting that the evolution of the abovementioned loan portfolio has a 
higher weight in rating changes of savings banks securities. It suggests that savings banks are 
affected by lower territorial and business diversification than commercial banks and that makes 
any deterioration in their loan performance to have a higher impact on the ratings. Other bank 
characteristics and, in particular, observed solvency and RoE also exhibit a significantly higher 
coefficient in the rating equation of the instruments issued by savings banks. As for market 
fundamentals, interest rates and GDP seem have a larger economic impact on the ratings of the 
securities issued by commercial banks while the observed real housing prices growth affects 
more significantly the ratings of securities issued by savings banks (all differences being 
statistically significant at 5% level) which suggests that regional conditions such as differences 
in housing prices may have had a significant impact on the ratings of those institutions (as 
savings banks) which are closely linked to regional territories.   
  5.5. Additional robustness tests 
We tried several other specifications of our empirical model for robustness purposes. As for 
estimation method, we also run a separate estimation for each equation using 3SLS. We also 
tried to estimate each equation separately using maximum likelihood techniques. Although the 
results of these alternative specifications were clearly in line with the reported GMM 
simultaneous equations results, the goodness of fit of the GMM model seem to be better, with 
larger determination coefficients (R
2). Additionally, the Sargan test suggests that the instrument 
specification better suited the GMM model compared to other specifications.  
  Regarding the specification of the model, we also wondered whether the issuance of 
MBS or ABS in certain periods might have more likelihood of having a more stark deterioration 
in credit quality, ceteris paribus, in ex-post rating changes. To check this potential ‘vintage’ 
effect, we run our model in a subsample of securities that suffered rating downgrades during 
2007 to 2010. We then restrict the time dummies in the model to the years 2000 to 2006 and we 
check if some of these dummies are significant. The results suggest that the securities issued in 
2005 and 2006 were more likely to be downgraded in the crisis years. As our baseline model 27
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includes time dummies (which are not shown for exposition simplicity) we control for this 
potential vintage effects.  
  Finally, in order to further explore the contribution of real housing prices growth to loan 
growth, loan performance and the subsequent rating changes, we introduce an additional 
robustness test. In particular, we build a dummy that takes the value 1 if the security was issued 
by a bank established in a region where housing prices have grown during 2000 to 2006 over 
the median value of regional real housing growth in Spain. For those banks operating in various 
regions we estimate a weighted average of the housing prices in these regions, using the 
territorial distribution of the branches of the bank as a weighting factor. We then re-run three 
alternative estimations of the baseline model by interacting the dummy with the variables 
Deposits/total liabilitiesijt-1 – to check if liquidity is more important for loan growth in regions 
with high real housing price growth – the ratio of provisions on loan lossesijt-1 – to analyze if 
loan-loss provisioning has been more significant in regions with higher growth in housing prices 
– and Securitization(ijt-1,t-4) – to identify how housing prices interact with past securitization 
trends of the issuing bank.  
  The results are shown in Table 7. Lagged securitization growth is found to have a higher 
impact on loan growth in the regions showing larger housing prices growth (the coefficient of 
the interaction term is .118). Similarly, liquidity seems to have a higher impact on loan growth 
in regions with higher housing prices growth (the coefficient of the interaction term is .124). 
Finally, the impact of loan-loss provisions on ex-post lending performance also seems to be 
larger in regions exhibiting the larger hosing price growth (the coefficient of the interaction term 
is .096). 
6. Conclusions 
We analyze the changes in the quality of MBS and ABS securitization in Spain from 2000Q1 to 
2010Q1 using a comprehensive database at the instrument-level. In particular, our empirical 
model shows the sequence of credit quality by analyzing the effects on the loan growth on loan 
performance and, subsequently, of loan performance on the rating of the instrument. 28
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1329
April 2011
 Importantly, our results suggest that bank characteristics such as solvency, cash flow 
generation and cost efficiency (on top of loan performance) affect ratings considerably. We also 
find that these bank characteristics have a higher impact on the rating changes of savings banks 
as compared with commercial banks, as well as those of these institutions located in regions 
with the higher growth in housing price in the years before the crisis. In terms of sequence, loan 
growth significantly affects loan performance with a lag of at least two years. Additionally, on-
balance sheet loan performance is found to lead rating changes with a lag of four quarters.  
Our results are robust to different specifications and robustness tests. All in all, these 
results advocate for further research on the consequences of risk transferring through 
securitization in countries like Spain, which have been largely dependent on market financing 
during the upswing of the cycle.  
We wonder to what extent our results could be generalized to other countries. 
Considering the importance of the securitization industry in the United States, it would be 
interesting to know whether the statistical relationship between ex-post bank characteristics and 
ratings would also hold in this country. Particularly as the relationship between mortgage lender 
and security issuer can be, in principle, more distant in this country than in Spain. Additionally, 
one identifying assumption of our model is that we focused on those securities (MBS and ABS) 
which allow issuers to transfer credit risks, as opposed to other instruments (such as the covered 
bond market) which usually involve a larger retention of the underlying risk within banks’ own 
balance sheets. However, in the United States, covered bonds have been scantly used. More 
research is needed in these directions in order to ascertain the risk-transferring properties of 
MBS and ABS in a wider set of countries as well as on the differentiated impact according to the 
type of funding sources.  
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Figure 3. Lending growth and loan quality in Spain  
(2000Q1-2010Q1) 
Source: Bank of Spain. 35
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Figure 4. Rating of MBS and ABS in the sample  
(2000Q1-2010Q1) 
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TABLE 1. Definition of the variables and descriptive statistics
Mean Std.  Dev.  Source 
Loan growthijt 0.11 0.07 
Quarterly accounting statements published by the Spanish Banking 
Association (AEB) and the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks 
(CECA). 
Non-performing loans ratioijt 0.03 0.02 
Information of Prudential Relevance Reports for data from 2007 to 2009. 
For the remaining periods the information has been gathered from 
quarterly bank reports and publicly available information provided by the 
banks to the Spanish Securities Exchange Commission (CNMV), as well 
as from occasional reports and memos provided by the banks. 
Ratingijt 79.1  34.8  Moody's, Fitch and S&P 
Equity/Total assetsijt 0.09 0.05 
Quarterly accounting statements published by the Spanish Banking 
Association (AEB) and the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks 
(CECA). 
Size (logTA)ijt 15.39 2.16 
Quarterly accounting statements published by the Spanish Banking 
Association (AEB) and the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks 
(CECA)
Deposits/total liabilitiesijt-1 0.71 0.19 
Quarterly accounting statements published by the Spanish Banking 
Association (AEB) and the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks 
(CECA). 
Lerner indexijt 0.22 0.04 
Quarterly accounting statements published by the Spanish Banking 
Association (AEB) and the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks 
(CECA). 
Cost/income ratioijt 0.58 0.39 
Quarterly accounting statements published by the Spanish Banking 
Association (AEB) and the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks 
(CECA). 
Branch growthijt 0.04 0.05 
Quarterly accounting statements published by the Spanish Banking 
Association (AEB) and the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks 
(CECA). 
RoEijt 0.11 0.6 
Quarterly accounting statements published by the Spanish Banking 
Association (AEB) and the Spanish Confederation of Savings Banks 
(CECA). 
Ratio of provisions on loan lossesijt 0.44 0.17 
Information of Prudential Relevance Reports for data from 2007 to 2009. 
For the remaining periods the information has been gathered from 
quarterly bank reports and publicly available information provided by the 
banks to the Spanish Securities Exchange Commission (CNMV), as well 
as from occasional reports and memos provided by the banks. 
1-year Euribor ratet 0.03  0.02  Bank of Spain 
GDPGijt 0.03  0.02  Spanish Statistical Office (INE) 
Real housing prices growthijt 0.05  0.04  Spanish Statistical Office (INE) 37
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TABLE 2. Baseline model of credit quality 
GMM simultaneous estimation with fixed effects 






Loan growthijt-1 0.004** -  - 
(0.002)    
Loan growthijt-4 - 0.028  - 
 (0.321)   
Loan growthijt-8 - 0.063*  - 
 (0.031)   
Loan growthijt-16 - 0.085**  - 
 (0.004)   
Equity/Total assetsijt-1 0.089** -0.034*  0.104** 
(0.001) (0.023)  (0.003) 
Size (logTA)ijt 0.016 0.017  0.031* 
(0.089) (0.339)  (0.048) 
Deposits/total liabilitiesijt-1 0.078** -  - 
(0.002) -   
Securitizationij(t-1,t-4) 0.096** -  - 
(0.002) -   
Lerner indexijt -0.014* -0.017  - 
(0.028) (0.143)   
Cost/income ratioijt -0.018 0.048*  -0.033* 
(0.234) (0.027)  (0.011) 
Branch growthijt-8 0.029* 0.019**  - 
(0.031) (0.005)   
RoEijt-1 0.018* -0.017*  0.078** 
(0.022) (0.044)  (0.016) 
Non-performing loansijt-1 - 0.019*  -0.014 
 (0.019)  (0.287) 
Non-performing loansijt-4 - -  -0.051* 
   (0.039) 
Non-performing loansijt-8 - -  -0.076** 
   (0.003) 
Non-performing loansijt-16 - -  -0.189** 
   (0.002) 
Ratio of provisions on loan lossesijt-1 - 0.027**  0.167** 
 (0.003)  (0.003) 
Years to maturityijt - -  0.046* 
   (0.017) 
1-year Euribor ratet -0.039** -  -0.034* 
(0.002)   (0.030) 
GDPGijt 0.104** -0.043**  0.018** 
(0.003) (0.004)  (0.004) 
Real housing prices growthijt-1 0.071** -  0.091** 
(0.003)   (0.002) 
Dummy MBS/ABS (1,0)  0.031* -0.002  0.178** 
(0.019) (0.084)  (0.004) 
Adjusted R2  0.84 0.86  0.90 
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TABLE 3. Credit quality: MBS 
GMM simultaneous estimation with fixed effects 
(p-values in parentheses) 
Loan growthijt    Non-performing 
loans ratioijt
Rating MBSijt
Loan growthijt-1 0.003** -  - 
(0.002)    
Loan growthijt-4 - 0.031  - 
 (0.397)   
Loan growthijt-8 - 0.083*  - 
 (0.039)   
Loan growthijt-16 - 0.104**  - 
 (0.002)   
Equity/Total assetsijt-1 0.072** -0.053**  0.102** 
(0.001) (0.009)  (0.002) 
Size (logTA)ijt 0.004 0.004  0.054* 
(0.106) (0.457)  (0.042) 
Deposits/total liabilitiesijt-1 0.071** -  - 
(0.002) -   
Securitizationij(t-1,t-4) 0.107** -  - 
(0.001) -   
Lerner indexijt -0.018* -0.012  - 
(0.020) (0.143)   
Cost/income ratioijt -0.012 0.031*  -0.047* 
(0.299) (0.021)  (0.016) 
Branch growthijt-4 0.033* 0.026**  - 
(0.018) (0.003)   
RoEijt-1 0.023* -0.034*  0.095** 
 (0.031)  (0.026)  (0.013) 
Non-performing loansijt-1 - 0.024*  -0.008 
 (0.022)  (0.446) 
Non-performing loansijt-4 - -  -0.087* 
   (0.034) 
Non-performing loansijt-8 - -  -0.113** 
   (0.002) 
Non-performing loansijt-16 - -  -0.205** 
   (0.003) 
Ratio of provisions on loan 
lossesijt-1
- 0.035**  0.197** 
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Years to maturityijt    0.054* 
   (0.019) 
1-year Euribor ratet -0.025** -  -0,021** 
(0.001)   (0.004) 
GDPGijt 0.009** -0.061**  0.020** 
(0.003) (0.002)  (0.002) 
Real housing prices 
growthijt
0.083** -  0.293** 
(0.002)   (0.002) 
MBS collateral type 
(1=residential mortgage; 
0=commercial RE loan) 
- -  0.089** 
   (0.005) 
Adjusted R2  0.87 0.88  0.92 
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TABLE 4. Credit quality: ABS
GMM simultaneous estimation with fixed effects 
(p-values in parentheses) 
Loan growthijt    Non-performing 
loans ratioijt
Rating ABSijt
Loan growthijt-1 0.005** -  - 
(0.002)    
Loan growthijt-4 - 0,006  - 
 (0.511)   
Loan growthijt-8 - 0.069*  - 
 (0.024)   
Loan growthijt-16 - 0.187**  - 
 (0.002)   
Equity/Total assetsijt-1 0.044* -0.018**  0.188** 
(0.027) (0.006)  (0.002) 
Size (logTA)ijt 0.004 0.008  0.014 
(0.154) (0.632)  (0.092) 
Deposits/total liabilitiesijt-1 0.087** -  - 
(0.003) -   
Securitizationij(t-1,t-4) 0.126** -  - 
(0.001) -   
Lerner indexijt -0.034** -0,024*  - 
(0.009) (0.032)   
Cost/income ratioijt -0.026 0.058*  -0.011* 
(0.138) (0.012)  (0.035) 
Branch growthijt-4 0.041 0.035**  - 
(0.097) (0.002)   
RoEijt-1 0.013 -0.013*  0.042* 
 (0.107)  (0.046)  (0.015) 
Non-performing loansijt-1 - 0.016*  -0.016 
 (0.027)  (0.427) 
Non-performing loansijt-4 - -  -0.035 
   (0.181) 
Non-performing loansijt-8 - -  -0.195* 
   (0.047) 
Non-performing loansijt-16 - -  -0.322** 
   (0.003) 
Ratio of provisions on loan lossesijt-1 - 0.011**  0.114** 
 (0.002)  (0.004) 
Years to maturityijt    0.093* 
   (0.010) 
1-year Euribor ratet -0.033** -  -0,018** 
(0.001)   (0.003) 
GDPGijt 0.011** -0.033**  0.027** 
(0.002) (0.003)  (0.002) 
Real housing prices growthijt 0.071 -  0.029* 
(0.127)   (0.014) 
ABS collateral type (1=corporate 
loans; 2=other loans and receivables) 
- -  0.050** 
   (0.006) 
Adjusted R2  0.76 0.79  0.83 
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TABLE 5. Baseline model of credit quality: two periods (2000-2007, 2008-2010) 
GMM simultaneous estimation with fixed effects 













Loan growthijt-1 0.003** -  -  0.008**  -  - 
(0.002)     (0.002)     
Loan growthijt-4 - 0.012  -  -  0.038  - 
 (0.485)      (0.422)   
Loan growthijt-8 - 0.084**  -  -  0.058*  - 
 (0.015)      (0.023)   
Loan growthijt-16 - 0.093**  -  -  0.067*  - 
 (0.002)      (0.010)   
Equity/Total assetsijt-1 0.081** -0.038**  0.124**  0.094**  -0.019*  0.118** 
(0.001) (0.020)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.021)  (0.003) 
Size (logTA)ijt 0.019 0.019  0.038**  0.014  0.012  0.040* 
(0.071) (0.503)  (0.030)  (0.076)  (0.326)  (0.056) 
Deposits/total liabilitiesijt-1 0.071** -  -  0.092**  -  - 
(0.002) -    (0.002)  -   
Securitizationij(t-1,t-4) 0.092** -  -  0.115**  -  - 
(0.002) -    (0.002)  -   
Lerner indexijt -0.018** -0.010  -  -0.004 -0.004  - 
(0.016) (0.134)    (0.032)  (0.236)   
Cost/income ratioijt -0.014 0.042*  -0.036*  -0.013  0.041*  -0.041* 
(0.235) (0.022)  (0.009)  (0.240)  (0.021)  (0.010) 
Branch growthijt-8 0.034* 0.015**  -  0.021*  0.016**  - 
(0.031) (0.006)    (0.028)  (0.004)   
RoEijt-1 0.022* -0.021*  0.072**  0.016*  -0.014*  0.082** 
(0.020) (0.040)  (0.012)  (0.023)  (0.038)  (0.011) 
Non-performing loansijt-1 - 0.016*  -0.011  -  0.014*  -0.012 
 (0.012)  (0.235)    (0.025)  (0.275) 
Non-performing loansijt-4 - -  -0.040**  -  -  -0.058* 
   (0.024)      (0.031) 
Non-performing loansijt-8 - -  -0.071**  -  -  -0.093** 
   (0.002)      (0.003) 
Non-performing loansijt-16 - -  -0.164**  -  -  -0.203** 
   (0.001)      (0.002) 
Ratio of provisions on loan lossesijt-1 - 0.024**  0.163**  -  0.029**  0.145** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)    (0.003)  (0.003) 
Years to maturityijt - -  0.048*  -  -  0.032* 
   (0.014)      (0.014) 
1-year Euribor ratet -0.044** -  -0.031*  -0.032**  -  -0.031* 
(0.002)   (0.026)  (0.002)    (0.026) 
GDPGijt 0.101** -0.040**  0.021*  0.119**  -0.049**  0.019** 
(0.002) (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Real housing prices growthijt-1 0.086** -  0.098**  0.054**  -  0.082** 
(0.003)   (0.002)  (0.003)    (0.002) 
Dummy MBS/ABS (1,0)  0.042* -0.003  0.193**  0.030*  -0.001  0.143** 
(0.017) (0.076)  (0.003)  (0.014)  (0.092)  (0.004) 
Adjusted R2  0.86 0.82  0.88  0.79  0.82  0.91 
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TABLE 6. Credit quality: commercial vs. savings banks
GMM simultaneous estimation with fixed effects
(p-values in parentheses) 












Loan growthijt-1 0.003** -  -  0.007**  - - 
(0.002)     (0.004)    
Loan growthijt-4 - 0.016  -  -  0.017  - 
 (0.408)      (0.384)   
Loan growthijt-8 - 0.043*  -  -  0.088*  - 
 (0.016)      (0.037)   
Loan growthijt-16 - 0.048*  -  -  0.096**  - 
 (0.016)      (0.004)   
Equity/Total assetsijt-1 0.063** -0.050*  0.111**  0.116**  -0.021**  0.128** 
(0.001)  (0.013)  (0.06)  (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) 
Size (logTA)ijt 0.011  0.011  0.056*  0.023 0.013 0.012 
(0.115)  (0.261)  (0.037)  (0.081) (0.423) (0.079) 
Deposits/total liabilitiesijt-1 0.062** -  -  0.083**  - - 
(0.003) -    (0.004)  -  
Securitizationij(t-1,t-4) 0.123** -  -  0.088**  - - 
(0.001) -    (0.002)  -  
Lerner indexijt -0.007 -0.011  -  -0.026*  -0.011  - 
(0.071) (0.212)    (0.021)  (0.247)  
Cost/income ratioijt -0.026 0.060*  -0.024**  -0.013  0.061*  -0.068* 
(0.361)  (0.021)  (0.007)  (0.207) (0.035) (0.003) 
Branch growthijt-8 0.015* 0.013**  -  0.037*  0.029** - 
(0.037) (0.008)    (0.026)  (0.003)  
RoEijt-1 0.026* -0.023*  0.032*  0.011*  -0.009*  0.126** 
(0.019)  (0.037)  (0.011)  (0.027) (0.049) (0.008) 
Non-performing loansijt-1 - 0.014**  -0.003  -  0.022*  -0.018 
 (0.009)  (0.326)    (0.011)  (0.340) 
Non-performing loansijt-4 - -  -0.032*  -  -  -0.063** 
   (0.031)      (0.019) 
Non-performing loansijt-8 - -  -0.064**  -  -  -0.129** 
   (0.007)      (0.004) 
Non-performing loansijt-16 - -  -0.116**  -  -  -0.216** 
   (0.004)      (0.003) 
Ratio of provisions on loan lossesijt-1 - 0.021**  0.103**  -  0.041**  0.197** 
 (0.002)  (0.003)    (0.004)  (0.004) 
Years to maturityijt - -  0.068*  -  -  0.031* 
   (0.014)      (0.011) 
1-year Euribor ratet -0.027** -  -0.051*  -0.021**  -  -0.027* 
(0.002)   (0.022)  (0.008)    (0.023) 
GDPGijt 0.148** -0.058**  0.021**  0.091**  -0.031**  0.008** 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Real housing prices growthijt-1 0.026** -  0.016*  0.127**  -  0.148** 
(0.005)   (0.028)  (0.003)    (0.001) 
Dummy MBS/ABS (1,0)  0.018* -0.001  0.246**  0.023*  -0.001  0.163** 
(0.014)  (0.112)  (0.003)  (0.016) (0.142) (0.006) 
Adjusted R2  0.82 0.84  0.84  0.81  0.84  0.88 
          
Sargan test of overidentyfing restrictions  141.06 153.07 
(0.001) (0.008) 
Number of observations  9,128 11,158 42
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TABLE 7. Credit quality: tests on the impact of housing prices
GMM simultaneous estimation with fixed effects
(p-values in parentheses)
Regional housing prices and 
deposits
Regional housing prices and 
securitization

















Loan growthijt-1 0.004**  -  - 0.003** -  - 0.004** -  - 
(0.005)     (0.003)    (0.006)    
Loan growthijt-4 -  0.015  -  - 0.018 -  - 0.011 - 
  (0.335)     (0.308)    (0.226)  
Loan growthijt-8 - 0.036*  - -  0.091*  - -  0.061*  - 
  (0.026)     (0.040)    (0.043)  
Loan growthijt-16 - 0.050*  - -  0.103**  - -  0.115*  - 
  (0.014)     (0.001)    (0.013)  
Equity/Total assetsijt-1 0.053**  -0.061*  0.106**  0.101** -0.027** 0.116**  0.103** -0.017** 0.132** 
(0.001)  (0.011)  (0.04)  (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
Size (logTA)ijt 0.018  0.018 0.045* 0.037 0.012 0.026 0.044 0.018 0.014 
(0.124)  (0.204) (0.029) (0.083) (0.603) (0.113) (0.108) (0.292) (0.098) 
Deposits/total liabilitiesijt-1 0.043**  -  - 0.077** -  - 0.040** -  - 
(0.002)     (0.005)    (0.003)  -   
Deposits/total liabilitiesijt-1X high 
regional real housing prices growth 
dummy 
0.118**  - - - - - - - - 
(0.009)          
Securitizationij(t-1,t-4) 0.112**  -  - 0.080** -  - 0.093** -  - 
(0.002)     (0.003)    (0.004)  -   
Securitizationij(t-1,t-4)X high regional real 
housing prices growth dummy  - -  -  0.124*  - - - - - 
      (0.016)       
Lerner indexijt -0.010 -0.007  - -0.025*  -0.018 - -0.014*  -0.008 - 
(0.124)  (0.296)  (0.034)  (0.263)  (0.036)  (0.311)  
Cost/income ratioijt -0.036  0.051* -0.024* -0.018 0.052* -0.055* -0.018 0.065* -0.061* 
(0.250)  (0.017) (0.012) (0.243) (0.028) (0.002) (0.352) (0.041) (0.002) 
Branch growthijt-8 0.013* 0.011* - 0.030*  0.026**  - 0.028*  0.034**  - 
(0.028)  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.006)  (0.020)  (0.002)  
RoEijt-1 0.022* -0.020*  0.038*  0.017*  -0.007*  0.110**  0.018*  -0.012*  0.119* 
(0.016)  (0.044) (0.018) (0.022) (0.041) (0.006) (0.024) (0.046) (0.015) 
Non-performing loansijt-1 -  0.017** -0.005  -  0.016* -0.013  -  0.027* -0.017 
  (0.006)  (0.253)  (0.017)  (0.257)  (0.010)  (0.396) 
Non-performing loansijt-4 -  -  -0.038*  - -  -0.052**  - -  -0.050** 
   (0.026)    (0.014)    (0.029) 
Non-performing loansijt-8 -  - -0.068** -  - -0.140** -  - -0.117** 
   (0.004)    (0.006)    (0.006) 
Non-performing loansijt-16 -  - -0.123** -  - -0.202** -  - -0.203** 
   (0.006)    (0.004)    (0.004) 
Ratio of provisions on loan lossesijt-1 -  0.016** 0.114**  -  0.059* 0.175**  -  0.048**  0.181** 
  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.013)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Ratio of provisions on loan lossesijt-1 X
high regional real housing prices growth 
dummy 
-  - - - - - -  0.096*  - 
         (0.026)   
Years to maturityijt -  - 0.052* -  - 0.027* -  -  0.040** 
   (0.011)    (0.016)    (0.008) 
1-year Euribor ratet -0.022**  -  -0.059* -0.014**  -  -0.031* -0.015**  -  -0.014* 
(0.003)    (0.026)  (0.006)  (0.028)  (0.004)  (0.035) 
GDPGijt 0.128**  -0.054**  0.014**  0.082** -0.022** 0.011**  0.089*  -0.027** 0.006** 
(0.004)  (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) 
Dummy MBS/ABS (1,0)  0.025*  -0.005  0.260**  0.028** -0.003 0.144** 0.041*  -0.003 0.149** 
(0.011)  (0.199) (0.005) (0.006) (0.190) (0.008) (0.019) (0.122) (0.004) 
Adjusted R2  0.84  0.82 0.81 0.83 0.85 0.90 0.83 0.83 0.89 
Sargan test of overidentyfing restrictions  150.18 161.16  155.18 
(0.003) (0.004)  (0.004) 
Number of observations  20,286 20,286  20,286 WORKING PAPER SERIES
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